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An Asynchronous Double Auction Market to Study
the Formation of Financial Bubbles and Crashes
Sadek Benhammada1 • Fre´de´ric Amblard2 •
Salim Chikhi1
Abstract Stock market is a complex system composed from heterogeneous traders
with highly non-linear interactions from which emerge a phenomenon of specula-
tive bubble. To understand the role of heterogeneous behaviors of traders and
interactions between them in the emergence of bubbles, we propose an agent-based
model of double auction market, with asynchronous time management, where tra-
ders act asynchronously and take different times to make decisions. The market is
populated by heterogeneous traders. In addition to fundamentalist, noise, and
technical (chartist) traders, we propose a hybrid trader, which can switch between
technical (chartist) and fundamentalist strategies integrating panicking behavior.
We find that when market is populated by a majority of hybrid traders, we observe
quite realistic bubble formation characterized by a boom phase when hybrid traders
switch to technical behavior, followed by a relatively shorter burst phase when
hybrid traders return to fundamentalist strategy and change to panicked state. The
aim is to design agents which act asynchronously, with simple behaviors, but
complex enough to produce realistic price dynamics, which provide a basis for
developing agents with sophisticated decision-making processes.
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Introduction
Nowadays, financial markets play a central role in the economies across the world.
Therefore, studying and understanding their underlying mechanisms are a major
scientific and societal challenge. One of the traditional approaches to study such
systems consists in using analytical models. However, this approach has already
shown its limitations. In fact, most analytical models make unrealistic assumptions
such as the perfect rationality of homogeneous operators implied by the efficient
market hypothesis [16], which threatens the validity of their results and motivates
the proposal of alternative methods [31]. In this context, we suggest to use artificial
stock markets (ASM), as an attempt to provide a better understanding of market
dynamics by computer simulations based on multi-agent systems. Models such as
artificial stock markets are designed to capture the essential properties of real stock
markets to reproduce, analyze, and understand market dynamics through compu-
tational experiments [14]. Economic agents are represented by (software) agents
interacting in an artificial environment. Since the first artificial stock market was
developed in the early nineties at the Santa-Fe Institute [36], many market models
have been developed. Though most of them aim at understanding market dynamics
with the same multi-agents simulation methods, various artificial stock markets
proposed are created using different strategies and are customized for specific
requirements. Some are synchronous, whereas others are asynchronous. Some are
populated by homogeneous traders, whereas others are populated by different
heterogeneous traders. Good and recent overview of ASMs can be found in
[8, 10, 27, 28].
The formation of speculative bubbles is an important phenomenon that occurs in
stock markets. It is typically understood as an increase in prices which deviates from
fundamental values, followed by sudden drop in prices called crash. Kindleberger
and Aliber [25] define a bubble as ‘‘any significant increase in the price of an asset
or a security or a commodity that cannot be explained by the fundamentals’’.
Similarly, Barlevy [3] highlighted that most economists would define a bubble ‘‘as a
situation where an asset’s price exceeds the fundamental value of the asset’’. [40]
affirm that ‘‘a financial bubble is a temporary situation where prices become
elevated beyond any realistic fundamental valuations’’.
The importance of studying speculative bubble formation comes from the fact
that they are an immediate cause for financial crises [43]. Research on financial
bubbles has a rich literature of theoretical studies ([6, 15] and others), as well as
experimental studies where [38] proposed a standard design for experimental asset-
market to perform empirical studies of bubbles in laboratory, after which a proposed
standard design was used in many works to perform experimental studies of bubble
such as in [18, 29] and others.
Experimental studies are performed with of number of investors in laboratory
endowed with the initial cash and a number of assets. Investors can buy and sell
assets during a defined number of periods. This method has limitations on the
number of traders, the cash available to traders, traded assets, and duration of
experiments. Artificial markets do not have these limitations and can present an
alternative. In the literature, we find some works that use artificial markets to study
the phenomenon of speculative bubble. In [19], authors propose a model inspired
from the Santa Fe Artificial Stock Market and the Minority Game with agents who
can choose between different strategies, authors found in their experiments the
appearance of an oscillating phase with bubbles and crashes. In [13], authors
developed a simplified fundamentalists and technical trader. They found that when
technical agents represent the main part of the agents’ population, during some
periods, the system reaches a critical state characterized by an increase in prices that
deviates from fundamental values (bubble) before falling back violently to its
fundamental value (crash). In [24], they found that the market with agents who
follow prospect theory and exponential discounting tended to cause a bubble and
crash. However, models used in these latter works are inspired from the original
Santa Fe artificial stock market [36], which is a discrete time and synchronous
model. The market evolves with a continuous time and traders act asynchronously
by sending independently buy and sell orders. However, [7, 34] have shown that
prices dynamics of discrete-time models are significantly different from those of
continuous-time models; consequently, the asynchronous nature of trading in real
markets should be explicitly considered in agent-based models.
In addition, one of the bubble characteristics is that the boom duration is longer
than burst duration (see ‘‘Measure of bubbles magnitude’’ for more details). Thus,
time simulation is essential to compare duration of boom and burst phases.
In addition, these works have not used measures of bubbles magnitude to analyze
results of experiments, such those used in laboratory stock market experiments, e.g.,
[12, 21]. Those measures of bubbles magnitude are crucial to be more precise and
complete in analysis of results.
To understand the role of heterogeneous behaviors of traders and interactions
from which emerge a phenomenon of speculative bubble, we propose an agent-
based model of double auction market, with asynchronous time management, when
traders act asynchronously and take different times to make decisions, thus we can
study time-related properties of bubbles. We develop heterogeneous agents, namely
technical traders (also called chartists or speculators) which use historical prices of
an asset to forecast its future trends and make decisions, fundamental traders form
rational expectations about the fundamental value of an asset, and make decisions
according to this value, noise traders representing traders unable to estimate the
fundamental value of an asset. In addition to these classical types in literature, we
propose a hybrid trader, which can switch between technical and fundamental
strategies, integrating panicking behavior.
To evaluate the model, we perform a series of experiments, we analyze statistical
properties of generated prices series, and we compare them with real price series.
We use some measures used in experimental economy to analyze the magnitude of
bubbles in performed experiments.
This paper is organized as follows. Section ‘‘Description of the model’’ presents a
description of the proposed model, its components, description of different traders’
behavior, and choices regarding time management. In ‘‘Results and discussion’’, we
perform a series of experiments and we discuss the results. Finally, ‘‘Conclusions’’
section concludes and outlines open research directions.
Description of the Model
We choose to propose a model of double auction market, because it is the most
widely used method of price formation in modern financial markets as well as the
dominant institution for the real-world trading of equities, energy, derivatives, etc.
[45].
The proposed model has three main components, (i) Market which allows buyers
and sellers of assets to interact to facilitate transactions; (ii) Traders who exchange
assets through the market; and (iii) External world which generates fundamental
values of assets used by traders to make decisions.
The Market
The role of market is receiving and executing orders placed by traders using
orderdriven system. An order x ¼ ðdx; qx; px; txÞ submitted by one trader is described
by a direction dx (buy or sell ), a quantity qx of assets to buy or sell, a quoted price
px, and a time of arrival in the order book tx. In a buy order, quote price px is the
maximum limit price above which the order should not be executed. Conversely, in
a sell limit order, px specifies a minimum limit price under which the order should
not be executed. The unexecuted orders are placed in the order book. At a specific
time t, the order book is described by two lists, the list of buy orders
Bt ¼ ðbn; . . .; b2; b1Þ, and the list of sell orders St ¼ ðs1; s2; . . .; smÞ. Where bi
represents buy limit orders (bids) and sj sell limit orders (offers or asks). They are all
waiting in a queue to eventually get executed. The list of buy orders Bt is arranged
in decreasing order of prices (i.e., pbn     pb2 pb1), while the list of sell orders
St is arranged in increasing order of price (i.e., ps1 ps2     psm). The highest
bid pb1, also called best bid, and the lowest offer ps1, or best offer, define the spread
(ps1  pb1). b1 will be executed only if the book receives a limit sell order s with a
lower quoted price (i.e., ps pb1). Idem, s1, will be executed only if the book
receives a limit buy order b with a higher quoted price (i.e., pb ps1).
If a submitted order finds a matching order of the opposite side in the book, a
trade is generated. When a trade is generated, the Market (i) deletes satisfied orders
from the order book (orders can be satisfied completely or partially (depending on
quantity), so the unsatisfied part of a partially satisfied order is placed in the book),
(ii) calculates the amount of a transaction, and (iii) notifies corresponding buyer and
seller. Once notified, the buyer makes payment and receives assets. Conversely, the
seller delivers assets and receives payment.
External World
The fundamental value is the expected discounted value of the asset dividend stream
[35]. It is expressed as follows:
FVðtÞ ¼
X1
h¼t
dðhÞ
ð1þ rÞðh tÞ ð1Þ
where d(h) is a dividend at time h, and r the risk-adjusted discount rate.
To estimate the fundamental value of the asset, traders use the information
coming from the external world; in this case, the estimated fundamental value can
be considered as a quantification of news with respect to the stock traded [7].
In our model, the role of External world is to generate fundamental values of the
asset that will be used by traders to make decisions. In our experiments, we will use
different jump processes to simulate fundamental values. Thus, to generate
fundamental values without trend, we use the following process:
Fvðt þ 1Þ ¼ FvðtÞ þ xt ð2Þ
where xtNð0; rÞ is a white noise from a normal distribution with mean 0 and
variance r2 ¼ 1.
To generate fundamental values with trend, we use following process:
Fvðt þ 1Þ ¼ FvðtÞ þ bþ xt ð3Þ
where b[ 0 is a constant.
Traders
At each time t, each trader i 2 f1; 2; . . .;Ng, has some number of assets qiðtÞ and
units of cash ciðtÞ which compose his wealth WiðtÞ calculated as follows:
WiðtÞ ¼ qiðtÞ:pðtÞ þ ciðtÞ; ð4Þ
where p(t) is the market price of an asset at time t.
To make a decision, each trader i is able to ask the Market some information
about its current state (prices history and order book), he can also ask External
world if his decision-making process requires exogenous information, which can be
used to estimate a fundamental value fviðtÞ of the asset at time t. Traders then can
use prices and fundamental values’ history to make decision. Three types of
decisions are allowed in the ASM: (1) submit a buy order, (2) submit a sell order,
and (3) wait. A trader i can borrow cash to buy assets, i.e., ciðtÞ 0 is allowed.
However, short-selling is not allowed, i.e., trader i cannot sell if qiðtÞ 0. In finance,
a trading strategy is a predefined set of rules for making trading decisions. An
investor uses trading strategy to assist in making wiser investment decisions and
eliminating the emotional aspect of trading [11]. In artificial stock market literature,
we can find different types of traders according to their trading strategies. We will
describe each type of traders that we integrated into our artificial stock market. We
chose to develop agents behaviors with limited cognitive ability, to determine
minimal conditions leading to the emergence of speculative bubbles. To the
exception of hybrid traders that we propose in this paper, the three other types of
traders are often encountered in literature; however, their implementations can vary
considerably.
Noise Trade
The noise traders will make a decision to submit a buy order, a sell order or wait
with corresponding probabilities Probbuy, Probsell and Probwait, respectively. Such
probabilities are defined as the parameter of the simulations and remain constant
during a given simulation experiment. If a trader i decides to submit a buy or sell
order denoted by x ¼ ðdx; qx; px; txÞ, the limit price px is calculated from the current
market price p(t) as follows:
px ¼ pðtÞ þ pðtÞ  eiðtÞ ð5Þ
eiðtÞUðai;þaiÞ,1 where ai is the maximal difference rate between current price
and limit price for trader i. The desired quantity qxUð1;QmaxiÞ, where Qmaxi is
the maximum quantity that a trader i may request to buy or offer to sell.
Fundamental Trade
The basic idea behind the strategy of such traders is that they form rational
expectations about the fundamental value of the asset and change their decision
according to this value [31]. The decision rules of the fundamentalist are shown in
Table 1. To make decision, a fundamental trader, i, estimates the fundamental value
of the asset as follows:
fviðtÞ ¼ FVðtÞ þ FVðtÞ  giðtÞ ð6Þ
where FV(t) is a correct fundamental value of asset received from external world
giðtÞUðhi; hiÞ, where hi is the error margin of trader i in estimating the fun-
damental value.
If pðtÞ\fviðtÞ, the fundamental trader i considers that assets are undervalued, and
so decides to submit a buy order b ¼ ðdb; qb; pb; tbÞ, the corresponding limit price is
calculated as follows:
pb ¼ pðtÞ þ diðtÞ ð7Þ
where diðtÞUðpðtÞ; fviðtÞÞ;
If pðtÞ[ fviðtÞ, fundamental trader i considers that asset is overestimated and
places a sell order s ¼ ðds; qs; ps; tsÞ, with the price:
ps ¼ pðtÞ  diðtÞ ð8Þ
where diðtÞUðfviðtÞ; pðtÞÞ.
Technical Trader
Speculation is traditionally defined as The purchase (or sale) of goods aims at
reselling them at a later date, where the motivation behind such action is the
expectation of a change in the relevant prices relatively to the ruling price and not a
1 The notation aUðx; yÞ expresses that a is a uniformly selected in [x, y].
gain accruing through their use, or any kind of transformation effected in them, or
their transfer between markets [23]. Traders who use this strategy are called
technicals, chartists, or speculators. We develop a simplified technical trader based
on historical prices analysis for forecasting the direction of prices, and estimating
market liquidity. The decision rules of the technical are shown in Table 2. To
analyze the trend of prices, technical trader i use moving average [31] defined as
follows:
MAðL; tÞ ¼ pðtÞ 
1
L
PL
i¼1 pðt  iÞ
 
1
L
PL
i¼1 pðt  iÞ
ð9Þ
where t is the current time and L is a period length.
To estimate market liquidity, technical i estimate effective half spread [5], which
is based on the actual trade price and estimated fundamental value. Effective half
spread at time t (ESiðtÞ) is calculated as follows:
ESiðtÞ ¼ pðtÞ  fviðtÞ
fviðtÞ ð10Þ
where p(t) is the last price of the asset at time t, and fviðtÞ is the estimated funda-
mental value by trader i at time t (Eq. 6)
To make a decision, a technical trader i calculates the moving average (Eq. 9),
and compares it to a threshold bi. Trader i estimates also the liquidity (Eq. 10) and
compares it with MaxESi which is the threshold above which market is considered
not sufficiently liquid. If MAðL; tÞ[ bi and, ESiðtÞ\MaxESi, trader i, therefore,
assumes that prices increase, and market has sufficient liquidity, and decides to
submit a buy order b ¼ ðdb; qb; pb; tbÞ. The limit price is calculated as follows:
pb ¼ pðtÞ þ pðtÞ  siðtÞ ð11Þ
where siðtÞ is randomly chosen from a uniform distribution in the range ½0; ai (i.e.,
the limit price of buy order is slightly higher than the current price). When trader i
assumes that price decreases (MAðL; tÞ\bi) or market liquidity (ESiðtÞ[MaxESi),
he decides to submit sell order s ¼ ðds; qs; ps; tsÞ. The corresponding limit price is
calculated as follows:
ps ¼ pðtÞ  pðtÞ  siðtÞ ð12Þ
i.e., the limit price of sell order is slightly lower than the current price. Otherwise,
trader i decides to wait for a given time.
Table 1 Decision rules of the
fundamental trader
State of the market Decision type Limit price
pðtÞ\ fviðtÞ Submit buy order b pb pðtÞ þ diðtÞ
pðtÞ[ fviðtÞ Submit sell order s ps pðtÞ diðtÞ
pðtÞ fviðtÞ Wait
Hybrid Trade
According to [20], bubbles are caused by a progressive diffusion of speculative
behavior in investors’ segments usually unaware of such practices but who,
becoming aware of gains they can make, are led to adopt this behavior. In addition,
in [35], the author states that once market liquidity decreases, any speculation would
be rendered impossible, and technicals return to fundamentalist behavior. In other
words, market traders do not necessarily adopt a single investment strategy, it can
switch between the fundamentalist and technical (chartist) behavior. This idea
already exists in analytically models of financial markets (see [17, 42]). Many
artificial market models implement also agents that are able to switch between the
two strategies or refer to fundamental and technical factors to make decisions (see
[2, 22, 30, 32]).
Therefore, we designed a hybrid trader, which can switch between fundamental
and technical strategy. When trader adopts fundamentalist (technical) strategy, it
makes decisions in the same way as fundamentalist (technical) trader presented
previously (see Tables 1, 2).
Hybrid trader i can be also in two states, panicked and not panicked. When it is
not panicked, the time required for traders i to take decision is uniformly selected
TiðtÞUðTmin; TmaxÞ, where Tmin (respect. Tmax) is a minimal (respect. maximal)
time necessary for trader to make decision. When it is in panicked state, he tries to
sell assets as quickly as possible [4], i.e., the decision-making time is less than when
it is in the not panicked state, so TiðtÞÞUðpanicTmin; panicTmaxÞ, where,
panicTmin\Tmin, and panicTmax\Tmax.
A Hybrid trader i is initially in not panicked state, and adopts fundamental
strategy. It has a desire DiðtÞ to become technical, initialized at InitDi. It
continuously observes prices trend using moving average (Eq. 9) and market
liquidity with effective half spread (Eq. 10). Every time, it detects an uptrend in
prices (MAðL; tÞ[ bi) associated with sufficient market liquidity (ESiðtÞ\MaxESi),
it can switch to technical behavior with a probability proportional to its desire DiðtÞ.
If it persists in fundamentalist behavior, it increases his desire of speculation Diðt þ
1Þ as follows:
Diðt þ 1Þ ¼ DiðtÞ þ ki: ð13Þ
In other words, whenever trader i detects that conditions of speculation are satisfied,
it becomes technical or increases its desires of speculation. When trader i adopts
Table 2 Decision rules of the technical trader
State of the market Decision type Limit price
MAðL; tÞ[ bi (Prices increase) ESiðtÞ\MaxESi
(Market has sufficient liquidity)
Submit buy order pb pðtÞ þ pðtÞ  siðtÞ
MAðL; tÞ\bi (Prices decrease) Submit sell order ps pðtÞ pðtÞ  siðtÞ
ESiðtÞ[MaxESi (Market has not sufficient liquidity) Submit sell order ps pðtÞ pðtÞ  siðtÞ
Otherwise Wait
technical strategy, it continuously observes prices trend and market liquidity. If
price tends to decline (MAðL; tÞ\ bi) or market liquidity is insufficient
(ESiðtÞMaxESi), he switches to the fundamental strategy and panicked state, and
resets desire DiðtÞ to its initial value InitDi. Initializing desire DiðtÞ allows trader i to
be more cautious towards technical behavior in future. When trader is in panicked
state, he cannot switch to technical behavior until it returns to the not panicked state.
Activity diagram of Fig. 1 summarizes algorithm of selecting strategy and state by
hybrid trader.
[R≤Di(t)] 
Activate Technical Strategy 
Chose
Di(t+1)=Di(t)+λi
( ) ( ) )]
[no]
[yes] 
Calculate MA(l,t) and ESi(t) 
[yes] 
[no]
( ( ) )
 and
( ) )
Check Activated Strategy
[Technical] 
[Fundamental] 
Calculate MA(l,t) and ESi(t) 
[no]
[yes] 
Di (t+1)= initDi(t)
Activate no panicked state 
Activate Panicked State 
[no Panicked] 
[Panicked] 
Check Activated State
[ ( ) ]
Calculate ESi(t)
[no]
[yes] 
Activate Fundamental Strategy 
Fig. 1 Activity diagram of selecting strategy and changing state by hybrid trader
Time Management
Most of the results in the field were obtained simulating artificial stock markets with a
discrete-time schedule, synchronous agents, or even both. On the other hand, real
markets evolve in a continuous time with traders acting asynchronously by sending
independently bid and ask orders. Artificial stock markets can evolve using either
discrete or continuous time. For discrete time, time is divided in periods: at each period
t, one trader or selected groups of traders make simultaneously (synchronously) their
decision and send their orders to the market. Therefore, the market is cleared and the
new price announced. Traders then update their cash and assets, and the simulation
jumps to the next period t þ 1. In continuous time models, time is not discretized and
traders can make their decisions at any time in a completely asynchronous way.
In [34], authors explain that a change in the sequence of arrival to the market of 2
orders may change the actual price by a significant value and eventually lead to
completely different subsequent market development (even if their arrival time
difference is arbitrarily small). To implement the asynchronous action of agents and
the continuous-time scheduling in our model, we used the concept of Markov Net.
A Markov Net [34] is a set of events that happen to a set of agents, the events are
linked by causal relationships, i.e., an event (effect event) is caused by another
(causal event), with a certain lag of time between the cause and the effect. At the
time of the arrival of the causal event, the effect event is only ‘‘potential’’, it can be
affected by another happening event in the lag of time.
In our model, events can be either information received by trader from the market
or external world, or either decisions made by traders. Information generated by
assets market and external world is the events that cause decisions made by traders.
The time of causation then corresponds to the time required for trader to make a
decision (see Fig. 2).
Results and Discussion
The aim of this section is first to compare statistical properties of price series
generated by performed experiments with statistical properties of prices dynamic in
real markets, and then, to determine the necessary conditions for the emergence of
Fig. 2 Principle of Markov networks
realistic speculative bubbles and crashes. The experimental design aims to explore
gradually the proposed model; thus, we explore different proportions for the
different types of traders and we observe the impact on price dynamics. Table 3
summarizes settings of all performed experiments. In experiment Exp.1, we test a
model with fundamentalist traders only; then, in Exp.2 and Exp.3, we introduce
noise traders and discuss their role on market liquidity.2 In Exp.5 and Exp.6, we
introduce technical traders and we observe their influence on price dynamics. Then,
we replace technical traders by hybrid traders, without panic in Exp.7, and with
panic behavior in Exp.8. To observe the impact of uptrend fundamental value on the
behavior of traders and on bubble formation, we generate a fundamental value with
an increasing trend ðb ¼ 0:5 in Eq. 3) during the first k ¼ 150 transactions, and
without (Eq. 2) for the remaining transactions. Finally, we conduct the sensitivity
tests of parameters that play a significant role in bubbles formation.
In the following, we present measures of bubbles magnitude we used. Then, we
observe the statistical properties of the experiments and we compare them with real
prices series. Finally, we analyze and discuss results of each experiment regarding
Table 3 Experimental design
Exp.1 Exp.2 Exp.3 Exp.4 Exp.5 Exp.6 Exp.7 Exp.8
General parameters of market
Number of transactions 5000 N/A N/A 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000
Number of traders 500 100 100 500 500 500 500 500
Open price 1000 300 300 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Rate of noise traders 0% 0 100% 0 100% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10%
Rate of fundamental
traders
100% 0 100% 0 100% 90% 45% 10% 10% 10%
Rate of technical traders 0% 0% 0% 0% 45% 80% 0% 0%
Rate of hybrid traders 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 80% 80%
Common parameters of traders
Initial cash 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000
Initial stocks 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200
Max. quantity (in order) 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Min. decision time 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Max. decision time 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
L (Eq. 9) N/A N/A N/A N/A 100 100 100 100
Min. panic decision time N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 5 2.5
Max. panic decision time N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 10 5
Parameters of generated fundamental values
Initial fundamental value 1000 300 300 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
b (Eq. 3) 0.5 0 2 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
k (Sect. ‘‘External
world’’)
150 0 200 150 150 150 150 150
2 Exp.2 and Exp.3 are the particular experiments performed to analyze the liquidity, while the rest of
experiments aims at comparing price dynamics with fundamental value.
the price dynamics compared to fundamental value and its relationship with the
behavior of traders.
Measure of Bubbles Magnitude
In this work, we give special attention to study speculative bubble, so we use some
measures introduced in experimental economics literature to analyze bubbles
magnitude. In the following, we present each of used measures.
Relative absolute deviation (RAD), introduced by [39], is the average of absolute
deviation of price from fundamental value relative to the average fundamental
value.
RAD ¼ 1
T
XT
t¼1
jPðtÞ  FVðtÞj
FV
ð14Þ
where FV ¼ 1
T
PT
t¼1 FVðtÞ.
A relative absolute deviation of 0.15 indicates prices on average to deviate about
15% from average fundamental value in either direction (henceforth, we say that the
market is mispriced by 15%) [18].
Relative deviation (RD), is similar to RAD, but instead of considering absolute price
deviations, it relies on (raw) price deviations [39].
RD ¼ 1
T
XT
t¼1
ðPðtÞ  FVðtÞÞ
FV
: ð15Þ
A positive value for RD is an indicator that the market on average overvalues the
asset, whereas negative values are an indicator for undervaluation, e.g., the value of
þðÞ0:10 for RD means that the asset is on average overvalued (undervalued) by
10% compared to FVs [39]. RD around zero indicates prices to track fundamental
value [18]. RD is by definition equal to or smaller than RAD. Large deviations
between RD and RAD indicate the presence of positive and negative deviations of
prices from fundamental values.
Boom duration is the greatest number of consecutive periods when prices increase
relatively to fundamental value [21]. It is measured as follows:
Boom ¼ max m : ePi  fFVi\ePiþ1  fFViþ1\   \ePiþm  fFViþm
n o
ð16Þ
where ePi (respect. fFVi)3 equals the median price (respect. the median fundamental
value) in period i.
Bust duration is the greatest number of consecutive periods when price is below the
fundamental value [21]. It is measured as follows:
3 In experimental economics, time is divided into periods; in each period, the fundamental value has a
fixed value. In our model, time is not divided into periods, therefore, to calculate Boom and Burst
durations, we divide the time of each experiment to 150 periods, and we use the median of fundamental
values in each period.
Burst ¼ max m : ePi  fFVi[ ePiþ1  fFViþ1[ :::[ ePiþm  fFViþm
n o
: ð17Þ
Positive deviation (PD), a deviation of the price from the fundamental value if
prices are above (below) fundamental value [18].
PD ¼
X
PðtÞ[FVðtÞ
jPðtÞ  FVðtÞj: ð18Þ
Negative deviation (ND), defined as deviation of the price from the fundamental
value if prices are below fundamental value [18]:
ND ¼
X
PðtÞ\FVðtÞ
jPðtÞ  FVðtÞj: ð19Þ
According to authors in [18], a bubble is characterized as (1) the positive Relative
Deviation of prices (RD is not below or at zero), (2) long Boom Duration and short
Bust Duration (Boom[Burst), and (3) high Positive Deviation and low Negative
Deviation (PD[ND). Thus, to measure the magnitude of bubbles in our experi-
ments, we will test the following null hypothesis:
H0 : RelativeDeviation 0
H0 : BoomBurst
H0 : PDRD.
Statistical Properties of the Experiments
First, we will observe the statistical properties of the experiments and compare it
with two real series. The aim is to evaluate to what extent the proposed model
replicates statistical properties of real-price series, e.g., ‘‘stylized facts’’. We
performed ten runs for each experiment, we calculated statistical measures of each
run, and we then report the corresponding mean and standard deviation. Table 4
shows results of performed experiments and those of two real series (FTSE100
index and Barclays banks [31]). We can see that price series generated by performed
experiments have statistical properties that are close to the real series. More
specifically, it has been found on real financial markets that log return of prices
exhibits a kurtosis[ 3, which indicates a leptokurtic distribution of return. This
phenomenon is known as heavy tails of log return distribution [31]. We can see that
kurtosis is higher than 3 in Exp.7 and Exp.8 when the market is dominated by the
hybrid traders, and so exhibits a phenomenon of heavy tails. It is the same in the
other experiments, except in Exp.6 where the market is dominated by technical
traders that we implemented for comparison purpose with hybrid traders.
We also measured the volatility clustering which is observed in real stock
markets, and characterized by a positive and significant autocorrelation of the
absolute and squared returns [31, 37]. Thus, we report, in Fig. 3, the autocorrelations
of the log returns, the absolute log returns, and the squared log returns of performed
experiments. In Exp.7 and Exp.8, when the market is dominated by hybrid traders,
the values of the autocorrelations are somehow acceptable. In fact, the autocor-
relation of log return decreases and becomes close to zero, while the autocorrelation
of absolute return decreases slowly, and remains positive and significant. In Exp.1
and Exp.4, when the market is dominated by fundamentalists, and Exp.5 when the
market is populated by technical traders and fundamentalists, we can observe a lack
of autocorrelation of log returns, when autocorrelations of absolute and log return
decay until they become close to 0. In Exp.6, when the market is dominated by
technical traders, the autocorrelation of log returns is always positive and significant
which is far from realistic.
Table 4 Statistical properties of log return in Exp.1, Exp.4, Exp.5, Exp.6, Exp.7, and Exp.8
Mean Median Minimum Maximum Kurtosis Skewness
FTSE100 0.0000341 0 0.058853 0.059026 5.13829 0.13
Barclays 0.0002035 0 0.089806 0.09374 4.62582 0.113409
EXP.1 0.0000245 0 0.067427 0.0667924 3.5152825 0.0390313
EXP.4 0.0000058 0 0.0629901 0.0649818 3.5455669 0.0015712
EXP.5 0.0000148 0 0.0490494 0.0563786 10.0921407 0.2092250
EXP.6 0.0023504 0.000368 0.0429592 0.0381872 2.7219738 0.1220623
EXP.7 0.0000239 0 0.060795 0.0610120 5.4510302 0.0604129
EXP.8 0.0000158 0 0.0611785 0.0596754 5.5936151 0.1406656
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Fig. 3 Autocorrelations for different lags of the log returns, absolute log returns, and squared log returns
on Exp.1, Exp.4, Exp.5, Exp.6, Exp.7, and Exp.8
Fundamental Trading
To study the prices dynamics with fundamentalist traders, we perform some
experiments using this behavior. The first experiment (Exp.1) was performed with
population N ¼ 500 of fundamental traders who are endowed with an initial cash
and a number of assets. Fundamentalists estimate fundamental values with an error
margin fixed at hi ¼ 0:05 for all traders. Figure 4 shows price series and
fundamental values generated by one run of Exp.1. We can observe that prices
follow very closely fundamental values.
Table 5 shows bubble measures of bubbles magnitude for every experiment.
Concerning Exp.1, we can see that RD ¼ 0:00025 is close to 0; in addition, we
cannot reject the null hypothesis that RD 0, which indicates that prices follow
closely fundamental values [18]. A null hypothesis that BoomBurst is not
rejected; in addition, Boom ¼ 2:5 and Burst ¼ 2:6 are not significantly higher
compared to the number of periods (150). Then, we cannot reject null hypothesis
that PD[ND. The tree null hypothesis is rejected, which confirms the absence of
bubble in experiment Exp.1. The explanation of this is that fundamentalists
representing 100% of traders in Exp.1 estimate the fundamental value of assets with
a small error margin (hi ¼ 0:05), and place orders with limit prices between the
current price and the estimated fundamental value (Eqs. 7 and 8); therefore, the
asset prices remained close to their fundamental value and no bubble is observed
with these traders.
Introduction of Noise Traders
The aim of this section is to show the necessity to include noise traders in the
population used in experiments to ensure market liquidity. The previous works such
as [26] has shown that noise traders can improve the liquidity of a market by
maintaining the balance of supply and demand. In this section, we first study the role
of noise traders in improving market liquidity (Exp.2 and Exp.3), and then, we
analyze the influence of noise traders on statistical properties of prices and measures
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Fig. 4 Evolution of prices and
fundamental values with 100%
of fundamentalists (Exp.1)
of bubble magnitude (Exp.4). Liquidity has three important dimensions: price,
quantity, and immediacy. A market is considered liquid if an investor can quickly
execute a significant quantity at a price near the fundamental value [9]. There are
different approaches to measure liquidity in the literature; here, we will focus on the
measurement of immediacy, i.e., the speed at which a transaction can be completed.
Immediacy can be approximated by average time between two consecutive
transactions. However, conducting experiments with our model, we found that there
are experiments where no transaction has been executed; therefore, it will not be
always possible to calculate the average time between two transactions. To measure
immediacy, we perform experiments over a fixed period and we observe the number
of executed transactions.
To study the role of noise traders in improving liquidity of a market, we conduct
experiments with a population N ¼ 500, composed of fundamental traders who are
able to estimate the fundamental value with an error margin hi ¼ 0:05 and noise
traders. We change the ratios of noise traders between 0 and 100%, and we observe
the number of transactions performed for each ratio. Experiments were performed
during 10 000 simulated time units, This is largely sufficient for traders to take
enough decisions, since the time required for trader to make decision is randomly
selected in the range [5,10] (see ‘‘Time management’’).
First, we conduct experiments (Exp.2) with the fundamental value that varies
randomly in time (see Eq. 2). Figure 5a shows obtained results. We can observe that
the number of performed transactions decreases slightly while increasing the rate of
noise traders. This is confirmed by measuring Pearson and Spearman correlation
coefficients, respectively, -0.7911118 and -0.8559429. The two coefficients are
negative, which implies a negative correlation between the rate of noise traders and
the number of performed transactions. However, market remains liquid even with
100% of noise traders (the number of performed transactions with 100% of noise
traders is 1826). In other words, when the fundamental value varies randomly in
time, the market is liquid with or without noise traders. We can explain why market
Table 5 Means of observed bubble measures and null hypothesis statistical significance testing in Exp.1,
Exp.4, Exp.5, Exp.6, Exp.7, and Exp.8
Exp.1 Exp.4 Exp.5 Exp.6 Exp.7 Exp.8
RAD 0.00657 0.00678 0.05314 0.81016 0.10228 0.07916
RD 0.00025 0.00010 0.00628 0.70436 0.09794 0.07537
Boom 2.5 2.3 7 7.8 18.4 19.8
Burst 2.6 2.4 3.4 7 17.1 10.8
PD 36.0 k 36.4 k 173.8 k 825.7 k 612.6 k 569 k
ND 37.5 k 35.9 k 137.3 k 3210.2 k 25.0 k 22.4 k
H0 : RD 0 NR NR NR NR a a
H0 : BoomBurst NR NR a a NR a
H0 : PDND NR NR NR NR a a
NR indicates that null hypothesis is not rejected
a Indicates that null hypothesis is rejected
is liquid without noise traders when the fundamental value changes randomly as
follows: The fundamental value changes randomly in time, thus, at one time, the
fundamental value may be higher, lower, or close to the market price; therefore, the
fundamental value estimated by fundamentalists (fviðtÞ) with a small error margin
giðtÞ 2 ½0:05; 0:05 (see Eq. 6) may be higher than the market price which implies
submitting buy orders, or lower than the market price, which implies submissions of
sell orders. Thus, the market remains liquid even without noise traders, because it
continually receives buy and sell orders submitted by fundamentalists.
Then, we conduct experiments (Exp.3) with an increasing fundamental value in
time (see Eq. 3). Figure 5b show obtained results. We can observe that the number
of performed transactions generally increase while increasing of the rate of noise
traders. This is confirmed by the positive values of Pearson and Spearman
correlation coefficients, where, respectively, 0.5239376 and 0.7985928. In the
experiment performed with 0% of noise traders, no transaction has been executed.
We can clarify why the noise traders promote liquidity when the fundamental
value increases in time as follows: when market is populated only with fundamental
traders and the fundamental value FV(t) increases in time and exceeds the market
price p(t). When the difference between fundamental value and market price
exceeds noise giðtÞ in estimating fundamental values for all traders i (see Eq. 6), all
fundamental traders i estimate fundamental values fviðtÞ higher than market price,
and so decide all to submit buy orders (see Table 1). Therefore, the list of sell orders
remains empty and no transaction will take place. In the case with noise traders,
they submit sell and buy orders irrespective to the market price and the fundamental
value; thus, the market remains liquid, because it continually receives buy and sell
orders.
To explore the influence of noise traders on statistical properties of prices series
and bubble magnitude, we performed an experiment Exp.4 with 10% of noise
traders and 90% fundamental traders, and then we compare the dynamics of prices
with those generated in Exp.1.
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(b) Fundamental value with increasing trend
(Exp.3)
Fig. 5 Number of transactions against the rate of noise traders in Exp.2 and Exp.3
We can see in Table 4 that price series generated by Exp.4 have statistical
properties which is very well related to Exp.1 and real series FTSE100 and Barclays.
Figure 6 shows the price series generated by one run of Exp.4. We can see that
prices follow very closely the exogenous fundamental value in the same way than
experiment Exp.1.
In Table 5, we see that RD ¼ 0:00010 is close to 0 and we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that RD 0, and the same for null hypothesis that PD\ND. Only a null
hypothesis that BoomBurst is rejected, but Boom ¼ 2:3 and Burst ¼ 2:4 are not
significantly higher. Thus, as in Exp.1, there is no significant deviation of prices
from fundamental values in Exp.4.
We conclude that noise traders promote market liquidity when informed traders
can in some situations take similar decision to buy or sell. In addition, the presence
of noise traders does not seem to have an influence on the properties of price series.
Thus, we will include 10% of noise traders in all next experiments to ensure market
liquidity, i.e., to run the number of transactions fixed in advance.
Introduction of Technical Behavior
To study the impact of technical trading, we performed some experiments using this
behavior. First, we performed an experiment Exp.5, with the population of 500
traders composed of 45% of fundamentalists, 45% of technical traders, and 10% of
noise traders. To compare the results with the previous experiments, we use the
same values of parameters in experiments Exp.1 and Exp.4. Figure 7 shows the price
series generated by one run of Exp.5. If we compare with Fig. 6, we can see that
prices are not as close to fundamental values than in experiment Exp.4 when
population was composed of 90% of fundamentalists and 10% of noise traders.
In Table 5, we can see that we cannot reject all null hypotheses except for
BoomBurst, which indicates the absence of bubble; however, we observe some
significant changes in some measures of bubble magnitude compared to Exp.4,
RAD ¼ 0:05314 is more significant than in Exp.4, and the same for RD ¼ 0:00628
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Fig. 6 Evolution of prices and
fundamental value with 90% of
fundamentalists and 10% noise
traders (Exp.4)
which is positive, this indicate a positive deviation of prices; therefore, there is a
deviation of prices from fundamental values. This is confirmed by the ND value that
is significantly higher than PD, unlike Exp.4 where values of two measures are
close. We conclude that the introduction of technical behavior has a significant
influence on price dynamics, and amplifies significantly the deviation of prices from
fundamental values.
Therefore, we study the price dynamics and bubble magnitude when technical
traders represent the majority of traders in market, we performed Exp.6 with 80% of
technical traders, 10% of fundamentalists, and 10% of noise traders. Figure 8 shows
price series and fundamental values generated by one run of Exp.6. We can clearly
observe a deviation of prices from fundamentals followed by a crash. However,
after crash, prices continue to fall below the fundamental value, rather than staying
around this value.
In Table 5, we can see that characteristics of bubble are not satisfied, since we
cannot reject all null hypotheses; however, we observe significant changes in
measures compared to previous experiments, thus, Boom and BustDuration are
more significant than Exp.5; in addition, RD ¼ 0:70436 is significantly negative,
and, the difference between RD and RAD in Exp.6 is large, which indicates that
prices are more undervalued than in Exp.5. PD is significant which indicates that
there is a period when prices are overestimated (bubble formation); in addition, ND
are significantly high, which confirm that there are a periods when prices fall below
the fundamental value.
We can explain this results as follows: Technical traders wait (do not take
decisions) until execution of L ¼ 100 transactions to be able to analyze trend of
prices using moving average (see ‘‘Technical trader’’ and Table 3), only
fundamentalists and noise traders are active in first time; thus, prices fluctuate
around the fundamental value such we will see in Exp.4, as FV is in uptrend during
the first 150 transactions (see Table 3); thus, prices have an uptrend at the start,
without deviating from the fundamental value. When technical traders analyses
prices and detect this uptrend, they submit sell orders which cause the deviation of
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Fig. 7 Evolution of prices and
fundamental value with 45%
fundamentalists, 45% technicals,
and 10% noises (Exp.5)
prices from fundamental values and the formation of bubble, when liquidity
becomes insufficient, technical traders submit buy orders which cause the fall of
prices below the fundamental value, because technical traders do not consider this
value to make decisions.
Replacement of Technical Traders by Hybrid Traders
Now, we replace the technical traders from (Exp.6) with hybrid traders who can
switch between fundamental and technical behaviors, and can also be in one of the
two states, panicked or notpanicked (see Fig. 1). We then use a population of 80%
hybrid traders, 10% of fundamental traders, and 10% of noise traders. To analyze
the role of panic behavior, we performed the experiment Exp.7 with hybrid traders
without panic. Hereafter, we performed Exp.8 with hybrid traders able to be either
panicked or notpanicked. Figure 9a shows price series and fundamental values
generated by one run of Exp.7. We can observe the formation of a bubble with a
boom phase followed by a crash. After the crash, prices remain close to the
fundamental value, unlike Exp.6 where prices continued to fall after the crash. The
results in Table 5 shows that RD ¼ 0:09794 is positive, and very close to
RAD ¼ 0:10228, which implies that asset prices are only overvalued (compared to
fundamental values). This is confirmed by the rejection of null hypothesis RD 0
and PDND. However, it is not clear in Fig. 9a whether or not the burst phase is
shorter than the boom phase. The results in Table 5 show that the difference
between boom and burst duration of Exp.7 is not important, and the null hypothesis
BoomBurst is not rejected. We explain the results of Exp.7 by the behavior of
hybrid traders which use fundamentalist strategy until the execution of L ¼ 100
transactions to be able to analyze trend of prices (see ‘‘Hybrid trade’’ and Table 3).
Only fundamentalist and noise behaviors are in the market before the execution of
these transactions. Thus, prices fluctuate around the fundamental value and follow
its uptrend. When hybrids traders analyze prices history and detect this uptrend, they
switch to technical strategy (see Fig. 9b). The switching of hybrid traders to
technical strategy led to a boom phase when prices increase relatively to
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Fig. 8 Evolution of prices and
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traders, and 80% of technical
traders (Exp.6)
fundamental value. When fundamental traders estimate that there is no sufficient
liquidity, they return to fundamentalist behavior, which led to a burst phase when
prices decrease and remain close to fundamental value. However, this deviation of
prices does not have all the characteristics of a bubble, more precisely the fact that
crash phase duration is not short compared to the boom phase duration.
Now, in experiment (Exp.8), we use hybrid traders that can be either panicked or
notpanicked. They may switch to panicked state when prices decrease or market
liquidity is insufficient (see Fig. 1). Figure 10a shows price series and fundamental
values generated by one run of Exp.8. We can observe the formation of a realistic
bubble with a boom phase and burst phase. After crash, prices remain close to
fundamentals values. A boom phase is larger than burst phase unlike in Exp.7.
Figure 10b shows the evolution of hybrid agents who follow a technical strategy in
experiment Exp.8. The comparison with Fig. 10a shows a direct relation between
the number of traders who adopt technical behaviors, and the formation of the
bubble. The more technical traders increase, the more prices deviate from the
fundamental value. To confirm this correlation, we measure Pearson and Spearman
coefficients of prices and the number of technical traders during boom phase. The
values of Pearson and Spearman coefficients are, respectively, 0.7892675 and
0.9737146. Both coefficients were positive and significantly large which implies a
positive correlation between technical traders and deviation of prices from
fundamental values. We see in Table 5 that we can reject a third null hypothesis
unlike in the previous experiments, where the three characteristics were never
verified. Thus, (1) RD ¼ 0:07537 is significantly positive; in addition, it is very
close to RAD ¼ 0:07916, which implies that asset prices are only overvalued
(compared to fundamental values), i.e., there are no period where the asset was
undervalued. (2) The Boom is significantly higher than the Burst. (3) PD is higher
than ND which is not significant regarding PD, which confirms a positive deviation
of prices from fundamental values. We, therefore, conclude that Exp.8 has allowed
the reproduction of a realistic bubble. Such as in Exp.7, the switching of hybrid
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Fig. 9 Evolution of prices and the number of hybrid agents following a technical strategy in Exp.7
traders to technical strategy led to a boom phase, and the return to fundamentalist
behavior led to a burst phase. While the switching of hybrid traders to panicked state
at the same time than the return to fundamentalist strategy has allowed to have a
burst phase duration shorter than boom phase duration; in fact, when hybrid traders
are in panicked state, they take less time to make decisions and submit buy order,
which accelerates the execution of transactions, and leads to a sharp decline in
prices.
Sensitivity Analysis
The aim of the sensitivity analysis is to determine the influence of parameters on
the output of the model [1]. Thus, to test the sensitivity of one parameter, we fixed
the other parameters to their reference value (i.e., the values that have allowed the
emergence of realistic bubble in Exp.8), and we performed experiments to a broad
range of values of the tested parameter, and then we analyze the output of
experiments to estimate the sensitivity of the model to the concerned parameter
[1]. The model contains a rather large number of parameters; however, we will
only test the sensitivity of some parameters which play a significant role in bubble
formation. The bubble is defined as the difference between stock price and
fundamental value, so we observe the output of experiments the value of Relative
Deviation (RD), which measures the deviation of prices from fundamental values
(Eq. 15). When RD is positive and away to 0, this indicates the formation of
bubble in experiment. For each parameter, we tested a range of 100 values, except
for the rate of hybrid traders, where we tested 91 values in the range [0,90],
because we need 10% of noise traders to ensure liquidity of market (see
‘‘Introduction of noise traders’’), the remainder of the population is fundamen-
talists (i.e., Rate Fundamentalists ¼ 100 RateHybrids Rate Noises). The test
of each parameter is performed 10 times, i.e., for each value tested, we perform
10 experiments.
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Fig. 10 Evolution of prices and the number of hybrid agents following a technical strategy in Exp.8
To analyze the sensitivity of model to different parameters, we build graphs
representing the output value of Relative Deviation with each parameter (Fig. 11); in
addition, we estimate the correlation of each parameter with the output value using
Pearsons and Spearmans coefficients (Table 6), and we test null hypothesis that no
correlation of parameter with RD.
In Table 6, we can see that p value of correlation test is less than 0.05 for all
parameters, whether for coefficient of Pearson or Spearman. Consequently, null
hypothesis that no association with RD is rejected for all tested parameters. All
parameters have a relation with RD; however, this relation is different from one to
another.
The model has a high sensitivity to the hybrid traders ratio. In Fig. 11a, we can
see that the values of RD remain close to 0 when the rate of hybrid traders is less
than 60%. This means that when hybrids are less than 60%, their switching to
speculation is insufficient to deviate prices from fundamental values. From 60%,
RD starts to deviate from 0 and becomes significant. This is explained by the
switching of hybrids to the speculative behavior, which causes a deviation of
price from the fundamental value and the formation of a bubble (see
‘‘Replacement of technical traders by hybrid traders’’ for more details). From
70%, RD begins to decrease but remains positive and significant; this can be
explained as follow: with a high rate of hybrids, there will be a high rate of
buyers during the boom phase, thus, prices increase quickly, so the boom phase
takes less time, and consequently, bubble duration decreases. RD is the average
of deviations of prices from fundamental values (see Eq. 15), and thus, RD
decreases also with the decrease of the bubble duration. It means that the bubble
is going faster when increasing the number of hybrids number.
The model is particularly sensitive to MaxESi (Fig. 11b). MaxESi is threshold of
effective half spread (Eq. 10) from which hybrid traders assume that market is
no longer liquid (see Fig. 1), after they switch to fundamental strategy and stop
pushing prices to deviate from fundamental values. The deviation of prices of
fundamental values increases when increasing MaxESi, which explains the
strong correlation between RelativeDeviation and MaxESi.
RD has a low positive sensitivity to parameter InitDi, the initial value of DiðtÞ
which represents the desire of hybrid trader to adopt technical strategy. We can
see in Fig. 11c that only with values of InitDi close to 0, hybrid trader persists in
fundamentalist strategy and prices remain around fundamental values.
RD has a positive correlation with ki that is the value used to increase a desire
DiðtÞ of hybrid trader i (Eq. 13 and Fig. 1). In Fig. 11d, we can see that prices
deviate from fundamental values even with small values of ki, the reason is
possibly the value of InitDi that is sufficient for hybrid traders to become
technicals when conditions are satisfied.
The model has a high sensitivity to parameter L which is a period length used to
calculate moving average of prices by hybrid traders (Eq. 9). Figure 11e shows
that with small values of L (lower than 200), hybrid traders cannot detect the
uptrend of prices and remain in fundamentalist strategy, consequently, prices
fluctuate around the fundamental value, and RD remains close to 0. When
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Fig. 11 Sensitivity analysis of the most important parameters
L[ 200, hybrids detect the uptrend in prices and switch to technical strategy
(see Fig. 1).
RD has a negative correlation with bi which is a threshold of moving average
(Eq. 9) from which hybrid trader assumes that prices increase. In Fig. 11f,
bi\0:1, hybrids detect uptrend in prices and switch to technical strategy (see
Fig. 1), which causes a deviation of prices and bubble formation. When
bi[ 0:1, hybrids do not detect uptrend of prices and thus remain in the
fundamentalist strategy; therefore, prices remain close to fundamental values.
RD has a positive correlation with k that is the number of transactions during
which the fundamental value increases (see ‘‘External world’’). We can see that
RD is close to 0 in some experiments (k 200). Figure 11g shows that with
small value of k, the uptrend in prices (following the uptrend of the fundamental
value) is not detected in some experiments by hybrids traders that persist in the
fundamentalist strategy, and therefore, prices do not deviate and no bubbles
observed.
Table 6 shows that RD has a positive correlation with b that is a parameter used
to generate a fundamental value with trend (see Eq. 3). In Fig. 11h, we can see
that RD remains close to 0 when b is negative or slightly higher than 0, when the
value of b is sufficiently high, RD becomes positive and significant which
indicates the formation of a bubble. A negative and small value of b generates a
downtrend or a slight uptrend of the fundamental values ignored by hybrids that
persist in the fundamentalist strategy. When the value of b is sufficiently high,
the uptrend of prices that fluctuates around the growing fundamental value is
detected by hybrids, which switch, therefore, to speculative behavior. This leads
to a deviation of prices from fundamental values and the formation of a bubble.
Conclusions
In this paper, we presented an asynchronous artificial double auction market
composed of heterogeneous traders, and then, we used it to reproduce market
dynamics. A first result of these experiments is the important role of noise traders to
ensure the liquidity of market. In the absence of noise traders, informed traders can
Table 6 Correlation test of
different parameters with the
Relative Deviation (RD)
a Indicate that p value is below
0.05, i.e., correlation is
significant
Coef. of Pearson Coef. of Spearman
% of hybrids 0.823a 0.916a
MaxESi 0.977
a 0.997a
InitDi 0.272
a 0.281a
ki 0.471a 0.482a
L 0.716a 0.801a
bi 0.741
a 0.655a
k 0.836a 0.902a
b 0.845a 0.732a
all make the same decision (buy or sell), which reduces market liquidity. When
fundamentalists are dominant in the market, prices follow closely fundamental
values. When market is populated with fundamental traders, prices follow the
exogenous fundamental values very closely. When market is populated by a
majority of traders who adopt a purely technical strategy, this leads to deviation of
prices from fundamental values; however, this deviation does not have all the
characteristics of a realistic bubble. When the market is populated by hybrid traders
who can switch between fundamental behavior and technical behavior as well as
panicked and not panicked state, we get a far more realistic speculative bubble
formation, hereafter followed by a crash. After the crash, prices tend to stabilize
around the fundamental value.
Now that we obtained a model able to reproduce speculative bubbles with simple
behaviors of traders, we aim at introducing other kinds of agents and corresponding
rationalities to find their potential influence on market dynamics. This latter point is
especially crucial nowadays that most transactions taking place on markets are, in
fact, achieved by computerized trading agents whose rationality is, indeed, inferred
from algorithms. In addition, as the previous studies evaluated the impact of
regulation policies on financial markets by the artificial market model (see
[33, 41, 44]), one interesting application of this work consists in testing and
evaluating the impact of regulation policies on real markets.
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